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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Does the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution because it is retroactive and effectively increases punishment for offenses
already committed by requiring offenders to register in person for up to life, and by
disseminating their personal information globally on the Internet?

2.

Does the Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act deny procedural due process by failing to
afford offenders a hearing regarding their current dangerousness before publishing and
disseminating their personal information?
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Doe v. Otte. is
reported at 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001).
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Doe v. Dept, of
Public Safety, et al. v. John Doe, et al.. is reported at 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001).

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1251. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision on April 9, 2001.
Defendants Otte and Botelho filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United Slates on November 21, 2001. This Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari on
February 19, 2002.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on October 19, 2001. Appellants
filed a petition for certification with the United States Supreme Court which was granted on May
20, 2002.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act is challenged under the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, art. I, § 10. The state statutes involved are Alaska
Statutes sections I2.63.010to 12.63.100and 18.65.087.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the basis of the constitutional
challenge to the Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act. The relevant state statutes are the
General Statutes of Connecticut sections 54-250 to 54-261.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Pierce v. Underwood. 487 U.S. 552, 584
(1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
1. Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act: Ex Post Facto Clause
On June 3, 1994, plaintiffs John Doe 1, John Doe 11, and Jane Doe filed suit under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 (2002) in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska,
challenging Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”) on multiple grounds, includinj^
that ASORA violates the United States Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto laws. (J.A.
109.) John Doe 1 originally filed under the pseudonym “James Rowe,” but after an individual
actually named James Rowe complained of negative effects, the court changed his pseudonym tc:^
“John Doe I.” (J.A. 213.) Named defendants are Ronald Otte, Commissioner of the Departmeat
of Public Safety, and Bruce Botelho, Attorney General of the State of Alaska. (J.A. 110.)
On July 27, 1994, the district court of Alaska granted plaintiffs motion to enjoin the stat^
from disseminating their personal information as required by ASORA. (J.A. 143, 197.) In the
same ruling, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ use of pseudonyms, ordering them to amen<^
the complaint using their real names. (J.A. 143.)
Plaintiffs appealed the decision, but on November 1, 1994 the United States Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding that they lacked jurisdiction, as no final judgment
had been entered. (J.A. 199.) When plaintiffs refused to use their real names upon remand, the
district court dismissed the case in its entirety. (J.A. 213.) The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal

2

and on December 1, 1997, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs should be
allowed to continue their case under pseudonyms. (J.A. 207.)

On remand to the district court, the plaintiffs, under their current pseudonyms, and the
defendants both moved for summary judgment. (J.A. 213.) On March 31, 1999, the court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary Judgment on all counts, and found that ASORA,
while a retroactive law, was not punitive, and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
(J.A. 168.) The court, however, did grant plaintiffs leave to renew on the Fourteenth
Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims. (J.A. 186.) On April 29, 1999, plaintiffs again
moved for summary judgment on the claim that ASORA violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (J.A. 203.)
On August 12, 1999, the district court granted defendant’s motion, and the following day the
court dismissed plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. (J.A. 192,204.) Six days later, on August
18, plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit, and on September 10, the
district court reinstated the preliminary injunction preventing the dissemination of the plaintiffs'
registration information pending the appeal. (J.A. 204,194.)
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on April 9, 2001. (J.A. 222.) In
its decision, the court held that ASORA was punitive for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause,
and therefore unconstitutional, and remanded the case back to the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska. (J.A. 222.) On April 23, Appellees-Defendants Otte and Botelho filed
a petition for a rehearing and a rehearing en banc. (J.A. 227.) The Ninth Circuit denied the
petition for an en banc rehearing on September 6, 2001. (J.A. 228.)
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Appellees-Defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States on November 21,2001. (J.A. 228.) This Court granted the petition for writ of
certiorari on February 19. 2002. (J.A. 229.)
2. Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act: Due Process Clause
Plaintiff John Doe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (2002) on Februar>^ 22, 1999
alleging that Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute deprived plaintiff of the right to
procedural due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (J.A. 84.) On July 5, 1999, plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in fictitious names
and requested that the court issue an order protecting plaintiffs’ identities. (J.A. 65.) The motion
was granted on July 14. (J.A. 65.) On July 9, 1999, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and
defendants (Commissioner of Public Safety, Director of the Office of Adult Probation, and the
Commissioner of Correction) cross-moved for summary Judgment on September 13, 1999. (J.A,
65, 67.) On April 18, 2001, plaintiff filed a motion for certification of the due process claim
class. (J.A. 70.) On that day, plaintiff also filed a motion for a declaratory judgment and for a
preliminary and permanent injunction on behalf of the class or, in the alternative, a preliminary
injunction on his own behalf. (J.A. 70.)
On May 18, 2001, the district court granted the motion for declaratory judgment on
behalf of the due process class and issued a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from
disseminating registry information to the public, in either printed or electronic form, concerning
any member of the class. (J.A. 71, 72, 85.) The injunction did not affect law enforcement’s
access to the registry. (J.A. 85.) Also on May 18, the district court granted the motion for class
certification and defendants moved for a stay of the injunction (J.A. 72.) The district court
denied defendants’ motion and entered final judgment. (J.A. 72.) Defendants filed notice of
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their appeal from the final judgment with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (J.A.
73.) Plaintiffs also gave notice of their appeal from the portion of the judgment which denied
summary judgment on their ex post facto claim. (J.A. 75.)
Appellants-Defendants filed another motion for stay of the injunction on appeal on May
18, 2001. (J.A. 101.) The court of appeals denied the motion on June 5,2001, but expedited the
parties'appeals of the district court’s final judgment. (J.A. 101.) On October 19,2001, the
Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the named offender had a
protected liberty interest in avoiding the implication of dangerousness from inclusion of his
personal information in Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registry and was entitled to a hearing to
determine whether he was currently dangerous. (J.A. 78.) The Supreme Court granted certiorari
on May 20, 2002. (J.A. 108.)
Statement of Facts
In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Program, codified at 42 U.S.C. section 14071 (1994). The
legislation required the U.S. Attorney General to establish guidelines for state programs
requiring persons convicted of crimes against minors or crimes of sexual violence to register a
current address with state law enforcement officials. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1)(A). The federal
law authorized the disclosure of registry information to law enforcement and government
agencies for law enforcement purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d). States were given three years to
comply; failure to implement a registration program would result in a loss of federal funding. 42
U.S.C. § 14071(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 14071(f)(2)(A). In 1996, Congress amended the Act, with
Megan’s Law calling for public notification and disclosure of registry information when
necessary to protect the public. 42 U.S.C. §1407l(d). Pursuant to Megan’s Law, Alaska and
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Connecticut adopted their own sex otTender registration statutes, codified at Alaska Statutes
sections! 2.63.010 to 12.63.100 and 18.65.087, and Connecticut Genera! Statutes sections 54-250
to 54-261.
1. Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act: Ex Post Facto Clause
a. The Alaska statute
In 1994, the Alaska state legislature passed the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
C'ASORA”), as a legislative reaction to worries of sexual offenses. (J.A. 212, 139.) ASORA is
made up of both registration and notification provisions. Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010-.100 (2001).
First, ASORA compels released sex offenders to register at an Alaska state trooper post
or at their local municipal police station under penalty of criminal sanctions. Alaska Stat.
§ 12.63.010(a) (2001). Persons who have been convicted of a range of both violent and non
violent offenses must register, including sexual assault, distribution of child pornography and
felony indecent exposure. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.100. Registrants are required to allow the
pertinent authorities to take their photograph and fingerprints, as well as to provide an array of
information including name, address, place of employment, date of birth, number and type of
prior sex offense convictions for which they are still required to register, anticipated changes of
address, and a statement of whether or not they have received treatment for a mental abnormality
since their conviction. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(b)(1). Those convicted of an “aggravated sex
offence” or two or more lesser sex offenses must register in person four times a year for the rest
of their lives. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(1); (J.A. 213.) Those convicted of a single sex offense
not considered aggravated must register in person annually for fifteen years, though this can be
tolled if they fail to provide “acceptable” information to Department of Public Safety. Alaska
Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(2); (J.A. 213.)
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Second, the notification provisions of ASORA provide for the dissemination of the
aforementioned information to the public. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087(2001). All information
collected is transferred to the Alaska Department of Public Safety, which in turn creates and
maintains a central registry. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087. This registry has been subsequently
posted on the Internet in the form of a searchable database which anyone in the world with
internet access can view. (J.A. 214.) The site can be searched by name, partial address, zip code
or city, and includes the registrant’s color photograph, physical description, street address, place
of employment and conviction information. (J.A. 214.) All registrant information, including
whether or not an offender is in compliance with the registration requirements, is subject to
public disclosure and dissemination on the web site with the exception of finger prints,
anticipated changes of address, and whether the offender has received treatment for mental
abnormality. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087(b). The photograph, along with the rest of the registrant’s
information, is displayed under a banner which reads “Registered Sex Offender.” (J.A. 214.)
b. The Alaska plaintiffs
Nine years before ASORA was enacted, John Doe I was sentenced to twelve years of
incarceration after he had entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of a
minor, after a court determined that he had sexually abused his daughter. (J.A. 212.) After being
released in 1990, Doe I was granted custody of his daughter after a court determined that he had
been successfully rehabilitated. (J.A. 212.)
Jane Doe is a nurse living and working in Anchorage, Alaska, and is the wife of John
Doe 1. (J.A. 212.) Jane Doe has never been convicted of a sex offense, but is challenging
ASORA because the forced registration and dissemination of her husband’s criminal history will
severely hamper her livelihood and constrain her ability to provide medical care. (J.A. 212.)
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John Doe II was sentenced to eight years in prison in 1984 for one count of sexual abuse
of a minor. {J.A. 213.) John Doe II was released in 1990 and has since completed a two-year
program for the treatment of sex offenders. (J.A. 213.)
John Doe I, his wife Jane Doe. and John Doe II, immediately commenced a 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 action against the Alaska Commissioner for Public Safety and the state Attorney
General upon the passage of ASORA, seeking to enjoin its enforcement. (J.A. 212.)
2. Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act: Due Process Clause
a. The Connecticut statute
Connecticut General Statutes section 54-250 requires persons convicted of certain
offenses to register with the Department of Public Safety and provide identifying information
including their name, a photograph, current address, criminal history, fingerprints, a list of any
other identifying characteristics, and a blood sample for DNA analysis. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54250(3), 54-251 (a), 54-252(a), 54-253(a). The Department of Public Safety then enters this
identifying information into the registry of “sexual offenders.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-257(a).
The statute requires that the Department of Public Safety share the registry information with
local police departments, state police troops, and the FBI, and that it be made accessible to the
public at the Department of Public Safety and all local police departments. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 54-257(a), 54-258(a)(l). The statute also requires that this information be made available to
the public on the Internet at the Department of Public Safety’s Sex Offender Registry website.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258(a).
The registry website can be reached through websites of various television stations and
through the state of Connecticut’s homepage. (J.A. 83.) Anyone with internet access can search
the registry by zip code, town name, and last name (or first letter of last name). (J.A. 83.) Each
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name that a search produces provides a direct link to another page titled, “Registered Sex
Offender.’* which provides the registrant's name, address, photo, and physical description.

(J.A. 83.) While the statutorily prescribed website contains identifying information regarding all
persons required to register pursuant to section 54-250, it does not contain any standards by
which members of the public can evaluate whether an individual included in the registry actually
poses a threat to public safety. (J.A. 13, 15.)
The website was first made available to the public on January I, 199. (J.A. 83). It was
shut down on May 18, 2001, pursuant to a permanent injunction issued by the district court.
(J.A. 83.) During this five month span, the “Sex Offender Registry” website was visited more
than three million times. (J.A. 83.)
The Connecticut statute also authorizes the Judicial Department, the Office of Adult
Probation, and any state and local police departments, to notify any private individual,
organization, or government agency of a particular individual’s inclusion in the Registry when
necessary for public safety. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258(a)(2). The statute, however, provides no
standards to evaluate when such notification is necessary and no procedures for contesting the
necessity of notification. (J.A. 17.)
The Connecticut statute does not permit a court of law to exempt anyone from the
registration requirements except individuals who either were under the age of nineteen at the
time they committed a second degree sexual assault offense or convicted of fourth degree sexual
assault. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-25 l(b)-(c). A court can restrict dissemination of registration
information concerning persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and
persons who fall within the narrow categories described in section 54-255(a)-(c). A court has no
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authority to exercise its discretion and restrict dissemination of registration information
concerning any other convicted persons. (J.A. 13.)
Persons who have been convicted of a single offense categorized as either an offense
against a minor or a nonviolent sexual offense must register for at least ten years. Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 54-251(a). Lifetime registration is required for those convicted of an offense against a
minor or a nonviolent sexual offense and have one or more prior convictions. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 54-251(a). Lifetime registration is also required of any persons convicted of first degree sexual
assault or a sexually violent offense. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251(a), 54-252(a).
Some registration requirements vary with the underlying offense, others apply
unilaterally to all registrants. (J.A. 83). Persons required to register as “sexual offenders”
pursuant to section 54-251 or 54-254 must submit an address verification form annually. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 54-257(c). Persons convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined by section 54252 must also provide documentation of treatment received and must submit an address
verification form every ninety days. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-257(c). Any person required to
register who changes addresses must register the new address with the Commissioner of Public
Safety within five days of the change. Conn. Gen. Slat. §§ 54-251(a), 54-252(a). If registrants
travel often or temporarily reside in another state, they must register with the appropriate agency
and comply with whatever additional obligations that slate imposes. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54253(b). Lastly, all registrants must submit to having their photo taken whenever the State
demands it. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a). Failure to provide any of the
registration information or comply with any of these registration provisions subjects a person to
possible prosecution for a class D felony, punishable by up to five years in prison. Conn. Gen.
Stat. §§ 54-251(d), 54-252(d), 54-253(c), 54-254(b).
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b. The Connecticut plaintiffs
Plaintiff John Doe, a Connecticut resident, has been convicted of one of the enumerated
offenses that require registration pursuant to section 54-250. (J.A. 3.) Plaintiff is a member of
and represents two classes consisting of those persons subject to the registration requirements of
section 54-250, and those who are both subject to the requirements of section 54-250 and whose
convictions occurred before the registration and notification provisions were effected. (J.A. 4-5.)
This class of persons consists of over 1900 Connecticut residents. (J.A. 7.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act: Ex Post Facto Claim
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution forbids retroactive application
of laws that increase the punishment for criminal offenses. As the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act (ASORA) has been stipulated to be retroactive, it only remains to determine
whether ASORA increases punishment for past offenses. This Court has utilized a two-step test,
set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. to gauge the punitive nature of a statute. First, the
intent of the legislature must be determined. If the intent is punitive, no further inquiry is
required. If the intent is civil, or ambiguous, a court then looks factors set forth in Kennedy to
determine the punitive effect of the statute. While not dispositive, if the Kennedy factors
indicate a punitive effect, then a court will treat the statute as punitive in effect for ex post facto
purposes.
First, the intent of the Alaska legislature is punitive. The legislature codified the Act in
the criminal code and set up procedural mechanisms for its execution, including in-person
registration for up to life, which show that the legislature meant to punish registrants in addition
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lo protecting public safety, as more regulator)' means of registration were available which would
have been equally as effective.
Second, even if the legislature's intent was ambiguous, ASORA is nevertheless punitive
in effect. However, since the legislature’s intent was not clearly civil, when considering the
factors set forth in Kennedy, this Court should not apply the ‘"clearest proof' standard, but rather
a lower standard of proof. Regardless of the standard of proof applied by this Court, ASORA is
punitive in effect when judged according to the Mendoza-Martinez factors.
ASORA creates an affirmative disability and restraint because the amount and class of
information that a registrant is forced to supply, including facts such as current employer and
employer address, is overly burdensome in relation to any legitimate public safety concerns.
Moreover, the registrant is compelled to provide this information in-person for up to four times a
year for life.
The Alaska Statute also promotes the traditional aims of punishment, namely deterrence
and retribution. ASORA increases deterrence as many offenders might not have considered
engaging in prohibited acts if they knew that their photo and personal information would be
posted on the Internet for the rest of their lives In addition, as the amount of time for which an
offender is forced to register is dependent, not on a current risk-assessment, but rather on the
gravity of the underlying offence, ASORA is analogous to parole or probation because it forces
de facto law enforcement supervision depending on an offender’s prior conduct. Furthermore,
the display of persona! information and a photo under a banner of “Registered Sex Offendef’on
the Internet provides the equivalent of public shaming.
While concern for public safety is a legitimate alternative purpose, ASORA is excessive
in relation to that alternative purpose assigned. Knowledge of an offender’s current address
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could rationally further public safety, but by compelling a registrant to provide other personal
information such as records of psychological treatment, and by displaying it on the Internet with
no finding of current dangerousness or any other restriction, the State's means are excessive.
The registration and notification requirements also apply to only those who are convicted
of the underlying offenses. If Alaska were to include all those charged with crimes, or to include
those not competent to stand trial, the proposition that ASORA promotes public safety would be
less tenuous. ASORA, however, includes even those offenders found “guilty but mentally ill.”
An analysis of the above factors indicates that ASORA is punitive in effect. The Alaska
statute should be held in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause as it is punitive in nature and has
been applied to Plaintiffs retroactively.
2. Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act: Due Process Claim.
Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act denies procedural due process by failing to
afford registrants a hearing regarding their current dangerousness before publishing their
personal information in the Sex Offender Registry and disseminating that information via the
Internet. Registrants have been included in Connecticut’s Registry because they previously
committed one of the enumerated offenses set forth in Connecticut General Statute section 54250, some of which include non-violent offenses. The Registry, however, makes no inquiry into
the current risk that a registrant poses to society and does not differentiate between those
registrants who are not currently dangerous from those who are. Because inclusion in the
Registry implies that those individuals listed are more likely than the average person to be a
danger to society, registrants are stigmatized.
The Connecticut statute implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest warranting
due process protection. The test which this Court delineated in Paul v. Davis to determine
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whether a due process violation has occurred is the “stigma plus*' test, which requires 1) an
injury' to reputation resulting from a government-made derogatory' statement, which is capable
being proved false and 2) an alteration of plaintiffs status as a matter of state law. The
registrants satisfy this “stigma plus” test because section 54-250 stigmatizes registrants as bein^
a threat to public safety by including their personal information in an undifferentiated and
publicly available registry of offenders. In addition, it changes registrants’ legal status by
increasing their duties to the State, subjecting them to criminal prosecution for a violation of aiyy
of these duties, and extinguishing rights previously afforded to them by state law. Following
Paul, this Court should affirm the decision of the Second Circuit and hold that the Connecticut
Sex Offender Registration Act violates Plaintiffs’ right to constitutional due process.
ARGUMENT
I. THE ALASKA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (“ASORA”) VIOLATES THE
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE BECAUSE IT IS RETROACTIVE AND INCREASES HIE
PUNISHMENT FOR PAST CRIMES BY REQUIRING PREVIOUS OFFENDERS TO
REGISTER WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS FOR A PERIOD UP TO LIFE,
AND BY DISSEMINATING THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET.
Article I of the Constitution forbids the government from passing “any ex post facto
law.

U.S. Const, art. I, § 10. The Ex Post Facto Clause was a result of the founding fathers'

apprehension of violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment,” Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 137 (1810), and fear that a legislature would be “templed to use retroactive
legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.” Landcraf v, USI
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994). This Clause is aimed at specific categories of
retroactive criminal laws, including those that “alter the definition of crimes or increase the
punishment for criminal acts” after their commission. Collins v. Youngblood. 497 U.S. 37, 42
(1990) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)). In the instant case, there is no doubt as to
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the retroactive aspect of the law, as it applies to persons convicted of offenses well before the
enactment of the Alaska statute, including plaintiffs. (J.A. 214.); Alaska Stat. § 12.63.100(5).
The only issue in the instant case is whether ASORA is punitive, as only a statute w'hich is
punitive in nature is subject to the scrutiny afforded by the Ex Post Facto Clause. Collins. 497
U.S. at 42. To guide the inquiry of the punitive character of a statute, this Court has set up a two
step inquiry which has subsequently been labeled the “intent-effects” test. Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 n963T Russell v. Gresoire. 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997).
As the registration and notification provisions of ASORA were passed as part of the same piece
of legislation and cross-reference each other, they will be discussed together. Alaska H. 69, 18th
Leg., 2nd Sess. 1 (1994).
The first prong of the test requires an inquiry into the intent of the Alaska legislature in
passing ASORA. To determine whether a statute is criminal or civil, this Court must first
“determine whether [the legislature] indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one
label or the other.” U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). If the “objective manifestations of
[legislative] purpose indicate conclusively that the provisions in question can only be interpreted
as punitive,” then there is no further analysis needed and the statute is treated as punitive for ex
post facto purposes. Kennedy. 372 U.S. at 169.
If, on the other hand, the legislative intent is civil, this Court will proceed to the second
prong of the test and look to see if the statute is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention.” Ward. 448 U.S. at 248-49. Where a legislature’s intent is civil or
regulatory, a statute will only be held in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause by “the clearest
proof’ that the effect of the statute is punitive, id. at 249. ASORA, however, was passed with
clear punitive intent. Because of the legislature’s punitive intent, the “clearest proof’ standard
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should not apply, and ASORA should be found punitive without further inquiry' into its effects.
Even if this Court finds the legislative intent to be ambiguous, the "clearest proof' standard
should not apply as the legislative intent was not clearly civil. Regardless of the standard of
proof, however, ASORA is punitive in effect as it imposes hea\7 registration duties on sex
offenders and requires the publication of personal information on the Internet.
A. The Alaska State Legislature Created and Passed ASORA as a Punitive Statute.
By looking at both the “objective manifestations” of the Alaska legislature, as well as the
legislative history, evidence of punitive intent arises. First, legislative intent as to the punitive
nature of a statute can be extrapolated from its placement within the legal system itself, such as
where the act is codified. Kansas v. Hendricks. 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (finding Kansas'
placement of its Sexually Violent Predator Act in its probate code rather than in its criminal cod^
as evidence that the legislature intended to establish civil proceedings); Femedeer v. Haun. 227
F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2000). Alaska codified ASORA in its code of criminal procedure
rather than in its civil code. Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010-.100 (2001). By placing the Act in the
criminal code, alongside other criminally punitive statutes, the Alaska State legislature revealed
its intent that ASORA was meant to be punitive in an objective and recognizable fashion.
Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 361.
Moreover, legislative intent is “clearly demonstrated by the procedural mechanisms it
establishe[s] for enforcing . .. statutes.” U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms. 465 U.S. 354^
363 (1984); U.S. v. Urserv. 518 U.S. 267, 288-89 (1996). While this language was used to
determine the punitive nature of property forfeiture proceedings, this Court made the distinctio^t
that where m rem forfeiture proceedings have been traditionally viewed as civil, these are in
“contrast to the in personam nature of criminal actions.” One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 46S

16

U.S. at 363 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.. 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974)).
Under ASORA, there is in fact an absence of formal judicial hearings between conviction and
registration, but in order to register and comply, an offender must present his person several
times a year in front of law enforcement officials under threat of criminal sanctions for partial or
complete noncompliance. Alaska Stat.§ 12.63.010(b) (2001). The fact that the legislature
established procedures by which an offender must physically present himself, rather than submit
the required information by mail or other form, indicates that this statute is of the in personam
nature of criminal sanctions. One Assortment of 89 Firearms. 465 U.S. at 363 In addition, by
requiring offenders to present themselves in front of local law enforcement agencies, instead of
in front of more regulatory agencies, such as the Department of Public Safety charged with
maintaining the central registry, the legislature made a choice to connect registration with bodies
responsible for preventing criminal behavior. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(b) (2001). By choosing
in person registration in front of law enforcement officials when more impersonal and regulatory
means existed, the Alaska legislature revealed its preference for more criminal procedural
mechanisms to apply and enforce ASORA.
Moreover, this Court has found that “[a]n absence of the necessary criminal
responsibility suggests that the State is not seeking retribution for a past misdeed.” Hendricks.
521 U.S. at 362. The Alaska legislature, in direct contrast, intended the Act to apply solely as a
result of past convictions. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(a) (2001); 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41 §1. If
the legislature had intended ASORA to be only regulatory or civil, it could have applied it to all
those individuals who could be found as threats to public safety. Instead, they have made the
application of ASORA exclusive to only those who have been convicted of past criminal
offenses, displaying that the legislature intended ASORA to be retributive. ASORA is therefore
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punitive as the Alaska legislature structured it in a way as to be triggered only upon past criminal
conviction, rather than on any finding of present dangerousness or other civil rationale.

The objective manifestations of legislative intent, such as ASORA’s codification in the
criminal code, the burdensome procedural mechanisms created in addition to its application only
to those convicted of crimes, indicate a clear punitive intent. As the legislative intent was
punitive, there is no need for further judicial inquiry. Kennedy. 372 U.S. at 169. By finding that
ASORA is punitive as well as being retroactive, it is therefore unconstitutional as it violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause. U.S. Const, art. I, § 10.
B. Even if Legislative Intent Were Ambiguous. ASORA Is Nevertheless Punitive in
Effect.
To determine a statute’s punitive effect, this Court has applied the factors set forth in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69. The factors set forth in Kennedy are:
[I] whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment—deterrence and retribution, [3] whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to that alternative purpose, [4] whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, [5] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, and
[6] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, id While neither exhaustive nor
dispositive, these factors provide guidance in determinations of the punitive effect of a statute.
Ward. 448 U.S. at 249.
In applying these factors, it is only upon a showing of “the clearest proof’ that “the
statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate” the legislature’s intent
to deem it “civil”. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (citing Ward. 448 U.S. at 248-49) (internal
quotations omitted). The Alaska legislature, however, did not deem ASORA to be civil, but in
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fact created and passed it with punitive intent. Even if this Court finds the legislative intent to be
ambiguous, the “clearest proof’ standard should not be applied in the instant case, as that
standard was meant to overcome legislative intent when it was purely civil. Ward. 448 U.S. at
248. This Court should use a lower standard of proof, as plaintiffs do not have to rebut express
legislative intent that ASORA is civil. Rather, the Mendoza-Martinez factors should applied in
light of the fact that legislative intent was at least ambiguous if not punitive in nature.
1. ASORA imposes an affirmative disability and restraint on those required to
register by compelling registrants to appear before law enforcement officials
multiple times, and bv disseminating personal information world-wide.
ASORA requires that registrants allow their photograph and fingerprints to be taken, and
that they must provide information including name, address, place of employment, date of birth,
number and type of prior sex offense convictions for which they are still required to register,
anticipated changes of address, and a statement of whether or not they have received treatment
for a mental abnormality since their conviction. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(b) (2001). Moreover,
some registrants must re-register in person up to four times a year for life, while others must re
register in person annually for fifteen years. Alaska Slat. § 12.63.010(d) (2001).
While sex offender registration acts passed in other states have been upheld by courts,
they have differed substantially in substance and degree. See e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist. 193
F.3d 466, 474-77 (6th Cir. 1999) (considering Tennessee statute); Russell. 124 F.3d at 1088-89
(considering Washington statute); Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1250 (considering Utah statute).
Unlike other statutes, ASORA obliges re-registration on at least an annual basis and up to four
times a year. Compare Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(d) with Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.130 (2002)
(requiring registration only once) and with Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5( 10) (2002) (requiring
re-registration annually). Moreover, to fulfill the registration requirements, offenders must
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physically present themselyes at a local law enforcement agency each time, and proyide
extensive personal information. Compare Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010 (2001). (J.A. 213, 214) with
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.130 (2002) (allowing change of address information to be submitted
by mail) and with Tenn. Code § 40-39-103 (2001) (only requiring information "to be delivered
to” the proper authorities). ASORA's requirements are far more burdensome than those
contemplated by other states, and those already brought under constitutional scrutiny.
Likewise, the notification provision of ASORA inflicts an affirmative disability and
restraint on offenders by publishing personal information on a website, making it available

throughout the world. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087 (2001). The Kansas Supreme Court held that its

registration act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause based on its finding that the statute imposed an

affirmative disability or restraint by failing to impose any affirmative dissemination requirement:
on the information. Kansas v. Mvers. 923 P.2d 1024. 1041 (Kan. 1996). The Kansas court

found that “unrestricted dissemination would make it impossible for the offender to find housing

or employment... [and] leaves open the possibility that the registered offender will be subjectec
to public stigma and ostracism.” id. Using similar criteria, courts have upheld sex offender
registration acts when they limit the dissemination of the offender’s information. Cutshall. 193
F.3d at 473 (Act’s notification provision is less punitive because information is only released
when it is necessary to protect public); Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d 1263, 1277 (2d. Cir. 1997)
(relying heavily on “carefully controlled” notification restriction to uphold statute).

Alaska’s notification provisions, however, have few substantial restrictions. While some
information, such as whether the offender is currently receiving treatment for mental
abnormalities, is restricted, most of the extensive information is available, including photo,
current residence, and employer. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087(b) (2001). In addition, this
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information is not given out upon request, but is posted on an internet site, which is searchable
by multiple criteria and accessible by anyone in the world, twenty-four hours a day.

Pataki.

120 F.3d at 1278 (noting the inability of the state to affirmatively disseminate offender
information in the absence of‘'vulnerable populations" as evidence that the statute is regulatory).
In tandem, ASORA’s registration and notification provisions establish an affirmative disability
and restraint by requiring copious amounts of personal infomiation to be delivered in person on a
regular basis, and then distributing it on a global scale.
2. The operation of ASORA promotes the traditional aims of punishment as it
produces a deterrent effect and is retributive in nature.
Other sex offender registration and notification statutes have been found to "implicate
deterrence.” Russell. 124F.3dat 1091: Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1252. ASORA itself has been
found to have a deterrent effect in prior adjudication, as it could rationally deter one from
engaging in the prohibited conduct. Patterson v. Alaska. 985 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Alaska App.
1999). The burden and humiliation of being required to register for life in addition to having
one’s image published on a website under the banner of "sex offender" would reasonably
discourage potential offenders. (J.A. 218.)
While deterrence by itself does not establish punitive effect, as civil penalties and other
non-punitive legal mechanisms are meant to deter as well, here the consequence of being
branded an offender is direct upon the individual. When this Court has determined that
deterrence serves both criminal and civil goals, the proceeding at issue was that of property
forfeiture based on criminal conduct. Urserv. 518 C.S. at 292; Bennis v. Michigan. 516 U.S.
442,452 (1996); One Assortment of 89 Firearms. 465 U.S. at 364. This Court made a distinction
between the civil nature of in

property forfeiture where a physical object is at issue, and “the

in personam nature of criminal actions.” One Assortment of 89 Firearms. 465 U.S. at 363. In
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the instant case, sex offender registration does not involve the sequestration ol properly, but
rather, it requires a person to register and have his image posted on an internet site, along with
other personal information. This deterring effect on the physical person of the ottender, rather
than on his property, gives ASORA a more distinct criminal nature.
ASORA is also highly retributive, and establishes duties directly analogous to those
required under parole or probation guidelines. Statutes that govern parole or early release can
also trigger the Ex Post Facto Clause, in addition to those that expressly increase punishment for
a crime. Weaver v. Graham. 450 U.S. 24. 30-31 (1981). Obligations under parole or probation
are part of the punishment for the original crime, which are distributed through a defendant's
criminal sentence. U.S. v. Soto-Qlivas. 44 F.3d 788, 790 {9th Cir. 1995). Under ASORA, the
affirmative duty placed upon registrants to report quarterly to their local law enforcement
officials and to provide and update personal information is similar to the duties required during
parole or probation in two substantial ways. First, offenders become obligated to register upon
conviction. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(a) (2001). Second, the length of time for which an
offender is required to register is based upon the original offense, not upon a determination of his
post-release dangerousness, implicating that sex offender registration, like probation, is part of
the original criminal sentence. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a); (J.A. 218.)
By basing the length of the reporting requirement on the original crime instead of the
present risk posed, the Alaska legislature has not only made ASORA analogous to parole and
other retributive forms of punishment, but it has also made the statute more retributive in and of
itself. Alaska created two major categories of offenders: those convicted of'"aggravated” sex
offenses or two or more sex offenses, and those convicted of one sex offense that is not
“aggravated.” Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a) (2001). The former category, which includes
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“aggravated" sex offenders, must register for life, while those in the latter category must register
for fifteen years. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(1), (2) (2001). Sex offenders, however, have
varying rates of recidivism, and often are no more likely than other criminals to re-offend. See
Jane A. Small, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due Process. Public Protection, and
Sex Offender Notification Laws. 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451, 1456-1457 (1999) (noting that
generalized recidivism statistics to all sex offenders are of little value); ^ Lawrence A.
Greenfeld, Bureau of J. Statistics, U.S. Dept, of J., Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of
Data on Rape and Sexual Assault <http://blackstone.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/soo.txt>
(accessed October 13, 2002) (finding that, among violent offenders, sex offenders had lower
rearrest and reconviction rates than average). Despite this evidence, Alaska put all offenses into
only two categories and imposed a lengthier requirement on “aggravated” offenders, not those
who are likely to re-offend. While the legislature cites to recidivism as a motivating factor
behind ASORA, the length of time for which an offender must register depends not on his
current dangerousness or risk of recidivism, but rather on the crime for which he was originally
convicted. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a) (2001); 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41 § I. ASORA,
therefore, is highly retributive in nature as it imposes lengthier registration requirements on those
convicted of more aggravated offenses.
Moreover, if an offender who is required to register for fifteen years fails to comply with
ASORA for a number of years, the fifteen years is extended by that same number of years.
Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(2) (2001). If the fifteen-year requirement was chosen for fear of
recidivism, then it would follow that the requirement would only endure the fifteen years until
the risk of recidivism has passed, regardless of an offender’s compliance. Here, however, Alaska
clearly gave ASORA de facto punitive effect by requiring an offender to present himself at a
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local law enforcement agency on fifteen separate occasions over what is essentially an indefinite
amount of time, with no finding of present dangerousness at any stage. This tolling of the
fifteen-year requirement further gives ASORA a clear retributive character as it is compels an
offender to register an unalterable number of times, rather than for a time period based on
dangerousness or risk of re-offense.
3- The requirements and consequences of the notification provisions are excessive in
relation to the legitimate public safety concerns that constitute an alternative nonpunitive purpose for ASORA.
As the Kansas Supreme Court recognized in its survey of other states’ sex offender
registration laws, most states limit the means by which the public can access the personal
information of registered sex offenders, either by basing the notification on a current
individualized risk assessment, by only releasing information to neighbors or persons in close
proximity, or by providing information only to those inquiring about a specific person. Mvers,
923 P.2d at 1038. Moreover, sex offender registration acts that have survived similar
constitutional challenges in federal courts of appeals have had more narrowly tailored
information dissemination provisions. For example. New York’s statute provides for an
individual risk assessment, and then creates a three tiered system of information availability
based on that risk, only allowing state-initiated dissemination to entities with vulnerable
populations. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1278. Likewise, in finding the relevant Tennessee statute

constitutional, the Sixth Circuit emphasized the fact that it only allows law enforcement officials
to release “’relevant information [when] deemed necessary to protect the public conceminu a
specifi^sexual offender.’” Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 470 (citing Tenn. Code § 40-39-106(c) (2001))
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082 (noting that the Washington statute only authorized release of
relevant and necessary information of specific sex offenders within a narrow geographic area)-

24

ASORA has none of these restrictions found in other sex offender notification laws.
First, most of the required registration information is allowed to be made public. Alaska Stat.
§ 18.65.087(b) (2001). Second, the information is not localized and made public only in the city
where the sex offender resides, nor only in the State of Alaska, but rather to the entire world via
the Internet. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087(g) (2001). Any claim that the public located in San
Francisco, some 3,000 miles away from Anchorage, has a safety interest in the employer name or
home address of an offender is tenuous at best. Although Alaska has a genuine interest in
protecting its public from possible re-offending sex offenders, ASORA goes beyond satisfying
that interest by requiring excessive information, and by making such information accessible to a
world-wide audience, far beyond the reach of anyone required to register under ASORA.
Moreover, any judicial determinations as to the fitness of previous sex offenders have no
effect on their duty to register. Such an occurrence is evidenced by Plaintiff Doe I. Doe I was
convicted of the sexual abuse of his minor daughter, after his release from incarceration, an
Alaska court granted him custody after finding that he posed little risk of re-offense. (J.A. 221.)
Despite this recovery. Doe I is nevertheless required to register four times a year for the rest of
his life, and have his picture published on the Internet. (J.A. 221.) The State cannot purport to
be protecting public safety, when a court or other body determines that, after substantial
individualized scrutiny, a sex offender has a low risk of re-offense. ASORA is excessive in
relation to the State’s interest in protecting its public, because it requires excess information to be
disseminated world-wide, without affording a registrants the ability to challenge their inclusion.
4. The Alaska statute applies only to behavior that is already a crime, and thus
effectively creates additional punishment for that crime.
ASORA only applies to those who are “convicted” of specific offenses. Alaska Stat.
§ 12.63.100(5) (2001). This is in stark contrast to other sex offender statutes that have passed
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constitutional muster under ex post facto challenges. For example, in finding the "criminal
behavior factor to favor a non-punitive classification for Washington’s sex offender act, the
Ninth Circuit cited specifically to the fact that even those offenders incompetent to stand trial
and those civilly committed were subject to the registration and notification requirements.
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit found the Utah sex offender registration
and notification statute to be non-punitive because it applied equally to those found not guilty On
grounds of “mental incapacity.” Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1252.
ASORA, on the other hand, only includes individuals who are “convicted.” Alaska Stat.
§ 2.63.100(3), Alaska v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944, 946-49 (Alaska 1987). As the registration and
notification provisions only reach those who are criminally convicted, the burdensome
requirements of those provisions should be treated as punishment for criminal behavior.
Although sex offenders who were convicted of strict liability crimes fall under the
requirements ol ASORA, a substantial proportion of crimes enumerated in the statute
require a finding of scientpr
Although this Court held in Kennedy that the statute need be examined only “on its face”
to determine whether a penalty is criminal in nature, in the instant case. Respondents are not
challenging convictions contained in ASORA, but rather are contending that the requirement
provisions are additional punishment imposed based on the prior convictions that trigger
ASORA. 372 U.S. at 169. All of the proscribed conduct that requires subsequent registration
are crimes, and many have a requisite mens rea.

Alaska Stat. § 11.41.458 (2001)

(indecent exposure in the first degree). Moreover, while many of the crimes are seemingly
absent of scienter, Alaska courts have read in a culpable mental state in many instances. See
V.

State, 664 P.2d 621, 625 (Alaska App. 1983) (finding that for sexual assault in

the first degree, Alaska Stat. § 11-41.410(a)(1) (2001), where no specific mental state is
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mentioned, the state must prove that tlie defendant “knowingly** engaged in sexual intercourse
and “recklessly” disregarded his victim’s lack of consent). Thus, for many sex crimes, including
ones revolving around consent, a scienter requirement exists despite the fact that the statute is
silent on the issue. Because many of the crimes that trigger ASORA require a finding of
scienter, ASORA should be considered punitive in effect.

6. While registration and notification laws have no historical equivalent, analogous
treatment of offenders has been considered punishment.
Requiring personal information to be disseminated world-wide and beyond any practical
use for Alaska law officials makes ASORA analogous to public shaming. First, under ASORA,
a registrant’s name, address, photograph, physical description, and criminal history are available
on the Internet under the banner of “Sex Offender.” (J.A. 214.) Far from creating general
statistics which might be helpful to law enforcement or the public, this method identifies an
individual offender, and presents the public with a variety of ways to avoid, harass, or ostracize
the registrant. Second, the information is provided by the State, not private individuals. State
dissemination was the means by which traditional methods of shaming punishments were
accomplished, such as forcing a person to stand in public with their offense written on their
clothing or bodies. E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1115 (3d. Cir. 1997) (Becker, J.,
dissenting). While the Ninth Circuit found that the Washington sex offender act did not
resemble traditional means of punishment, they did so on the rationale that while punitive
colonial practices “‘physically held the person up before his or her fellow citizens for shaming,”*
the Washington law only allowed the information to be disseminated under controlled
circumstances. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1092 (citing E.B. v. Vemiero. 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir.
1997)). Under ASORA, however, name, address, photograph and physical description are
available on the website. Alaska Stat. 18.65.087(b). By providing an individual’s persona!
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information to the public, ASORA renders its provisions punitive by holding the exact and
specific person up for the world to see and judge.

When analyzed using the factors set forth in Kennedy. ASORA is conclusively punitive
in effect because it creates an overly burdensome disability on registrants by requiring repeated
disclosure of personal information in person and on a regular basis. Moreover, the notification
requirements are excessive and unnecessary in relation to the goal of community safety, as the
registrants' personal information is published on the Internet, where it is visible to a world
audience, creating a shame-like punishment on a global scale.
II CONNECTICUT’S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT DENIES PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO AFFORD REGISTRANTS A HEARING REGARDING
THEIR CURRENT DANGEROUSNESS BEFORE PUBLISHING THEIR PERSONAL
INFORMATION IN A STIGMATIZING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY.
Connecticut's version of “Megan’s Law” requires that persons convicted of designated
offenses, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, register with the State and
that this information be made available to the public both in printed form and on the State's
internet website. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-257(a), 54-258(a) (2001). In order to state a valid
claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for a due process violation, plaintiff must show that the
Connecticut registration and notification statute implicates a constitutionally protected liberty
interest by satisfying a two-part test, known as the “stigma plus” test, as set forth by this Court in
Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S 693, 708 (1976). As applied to claims of government defamation, the
“stigma plus’* test requires 1) an injury to reputation resulting from a government-made
derogatory statement, which is capable of being proved false, and 2) an alteration of plaintifTs
status as a matter of state law. Id. Registrants satisfy this “stigma plus” test because Connecticut
Sex Offender Registration Act stigmatizes registrants as being a threat to public safety by
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including their personal information in publicly available registry of offenders, and because it
extinguishes or alters rights previously afforded to them by state law.

A. Public Dissemination of Connecticut's Sex Offender Registry Unfairly Stigmatizes
Reuistrants by Implying Current Dangerousness.
Connecticut's statute violates the Due Process Clause because it stigmatizes registrants as
being a present threat to public safety without affording them the right to a hearing to contest
such an assumption. The statute requires registration of persons who have been convicted of
offenses falling within any of four categories: 1) nonviolent sexual offenses. 2) criminal offenses
against a victim who is a minor. 3) sexually violent offenses, and 4) felonies committed for a
sexual purpose. Conn. Gen. Stal. §§ 54-250(5), 54-250 (2), 54-250(11). 54-254(a.). Inclusion in
the Registry is extremely broad, encompassing persons who have committed offenses ranging
from violent felonies to non-violent misdemeanors.
The purported purpose of registration and notification statutes such as section 54-250 is
to identify potential recidivists and alert the public when necessary for public safety. E.B. v.
Vemiero. 119 F.3d 1077, 1097 (3d Cir. 1997). This purpose was posted on the State’s website
up until the commencement of litigation: “This Information is made available for the purpose of
protecting the public.” Doe v. Dept, of Public Safety. 271 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2001). The
natural assumption that a viewer would draw, then, is that the public needs to be protected from
the people listed in the Registry.
The Registry, however, does not differentiate between registrants who are currently
dangerous and registrants who are not dangerous. Those convicted of, among other things,
nonviolent sexual offenses, must register, and they are lumped together in the same registry as
those who have committed violent sexual offenses. The statute contains no provisions for any
court or administrative agency to determine whether dissemination of registration information is
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or is not required for public safety. (J.A. 8, 15.) The Registry simply lists personal information
regarding ^ registrants under the glaring banner, "Registered Sex Offender." and broadcasts it
globally on the Internet.
The State has made it a point to not distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous
registrants when publishing registrants’ names, photos, and persona! information on the website.
The Department of Public Safety provides no process through which an individual s current
dangerousness, or lack thereof, can be evaluated. (J.A. 7.) fhe registry website even contains a
disclaimer to this effect: “The Department of Public Safety ... has made no determination that
any individual included in the Registry is currently dangerous.” (J.A. 31.) Moreover, some
individuals who are statutorily required to register have not even committed violent crimes.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-250(5). The website, though, does not state that the Registry' includes
registrants who are not currently dangerous. By purporting to protect public safety, the Registry
implies that all registrants are dangerous, even though it includes nonviolent offenders and has
made no determination whatsoever as to a registrant’s current dangerousness.
The stigma question then is “whether, assuming plaintiff is not dangerous, public
dissemination ot the sex offender Registry conveys the erroneous message that he is. The
answer to this question must be yes.” Doe v. Lee. 132 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D. Conn. 2001). To
meet the stigma element of the section 1983 claim, plaintiff need only allege, not actually prove,
that the government-made statement is capable of being proved false, in order to trigger due
process protection. Brandt v. Bd, of Co-op. Educ. Servs.. 820 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1983).
Although the actual information contained in the Registry (such as name and address) may be
factually accurate, inclusion in the Registry implies a registrant is more likely than the average
person to be a danger to society. Doe v. Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d 456,457-458 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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The message that the website communicates to its millions of viewers is that, by the ver>^ nature
of a registrant s inclusion in the Registry, that individual is currently dangerous and is likely to
reotlend. Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 457-458. ‘'This implication stigmatizes every person listed on
the Registry.” Id.
With inclusion in the Registry comes a stigma that attaches to the registrants, follows
them through their daily lives, into their homes and places of employment, and pursues them
around the world. Although registrants have already suffered harm to their reputations by being
prosecuted and convicted, they suffer an additional and more pervasive harm, when they are
subject to community notification and are publicly, and in some cases permanently, labeled as a
danger to society by the State. Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interest in the Preventative State:
Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws. Nw. U. J. of Crim. L.
& Criminology. 1167, 1192-1193 (1999). The world stands witness to their public shaming, yet
registrants have no opportunity to clear their names and shed the “badge of infamy” which they
arc forced to bear for any where between ten years and an entire lifetime. Wieman v. Updegraff.
344 U.S. 183- 190-191 (1952).
Connecticut's Sex Offender Registration Act denies procedural due process by failing to
afford registrants a hearing regarding their current dangerousness before publishing their
personal information in the internet registry. Public dissemination on the website conveys the
message that the registrants included are potentially dangerous because it amalgamates all
registrants into one undifferentiated category' of registered sex offenders. Although the actual
information contained in the Registry may be factually accurate, inclusion in the Registry implies
a registrant is more likely than the average person to be a danger to society. This unsubstantiated
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label is thrust upon registrants by the government. Registrants, though, are given no procedural
means by which to challenge this unwarranted stigmatization.

B. The Connecticut Registration and Notification Statute Alters Registrants’
Leizal Status Sufficiently to Constitute a^jMus Factor*’ Under Paul.
This Court held in Paul, that while "reputation alone” is not a constitutionally protected
liberty interest, damage to reputation, when coupled with an additional "plus factor,” is sufficient
to warrant due process protection. Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. at 711; see also Sietiert v. Gillev. 500
U.S. 226, 233 (1991). Paul defined the "plus factor” as a government action which distinctly
alters or extinguishes a right or status previously recognized by state law. 424 U.S. at 711.
Therefore, when a state alters or extinguishes a right that it previously afforded, it is sufficient to
invoke the procedural guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id
The “plus factor” finds its roots in Wisconsin v. Constantineau where this Court
invalidated a statute that permitted local officials to post a list in liquor stores of persons who
became dangerous after heavy drinking. 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971). The statute also forbade
those on the list from purchasing liquor for one year. Id. While the Constantineau Court
reasoned that an opportunity to be heard is essential “[w]here a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity are at stake because of what the government is doing to him”, the Paul Court
held that reputation alone is not sufficient to invoke the protections of due process.
Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 437; Paul. 424 U.S. at 723. However, in reexamining Constantineau
in Paul, the Court identified the right to purchase alcohol as a “right or status previously
recognized under state law” and therefore as a “plus factor” sufficient to trigger due process
protection. 424 U.S. at 708.
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In Paul, plaintiffs photograph was featured on a flyer circulated by local police officers

which listed persons recently arrested for shoplifting. Though the shoplifting charge was
eventually dropped, plaintiff filed suit under section 1983 alleging that the government inflicted
a stigma upon his reputation. Paul, 424 U.S. at 712. This Court, though, held that the mere
publication of the defamatory information was not actionable as a due process violation. Id In
essence, it takes “harm to reputation in addition to some other impediment, to establish a
constitutional deprivation.” Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 3d at 467. This additional impediment, the socalled “plus factor,” has been the foundation for all subsequent cases dealing with governmental
defamation. See generally Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 842-843 (1st Cir. 1987k sec also
Valmonte v. Bane. 18 F.3d 992, 1000 (2nd Cir. 1994); 1000; Sturm v. Clark. 835 F.2d 1009,
1012(3dCir. 1987k W.P. v. Poritz. 931 F. Supp. 1199, I219(D.N.J. 1996).
1. The Connecticut statute alters registrants' rights previously recognized under state
law and therefore satisfies the “plus factor” as defined bv Paul.
The Connecticut statute alters, and in some circumstances completely extinguishes, rights
of registrants previously recognized under state law. Registrants no longer have the right to
travel freely to other states; if registrants frequently travel to other states, they must register with
the appropriate agency in that state and comply with whatever additional obligations that state
imposes. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-253(b). Additionally, registrants lose the right to travel freely
within the state; instead they must submit address verification forms annually, in some cases
every ninety days, and must re-register whenever they move. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-257(c). 54251(a), 54-252(a). Recently, the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that the
Alabama Community Notification Act deprived the plaintiff, an offender subject to registration,
of rights previously held under state law, the extinguishment of which was sufficient to establish
a “plus factor” under Paul. Doe v. Pryor. 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231-1232 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
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Such rights included, among others, the right to establish a new residence without llrst giving
notice to the State, a right previously held by Connecticut registrants which is also extinguished
by the Connecticut statute. Ala. Code § 15-20-22(d) (2002); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-250.

Not only does the Connecticut statute extinguish rights previously held by registrants, but
it also creates a new set of duties that registrants owe to the State which they did not owe prior to
the passage of the statute. Such duties include providing blood samples for DNA analysis and
submitting to photographing at the State’s request and at least once evcr>' five years. Conn. Gen.
Stat. §§ 54-250(3), 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-253(a), 54-254(a). Failure to comply with any of
the requirements mandated by the statute subjects a registrant to possible prosecution for a Class
D felony, punishable by up to five years in prison. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251(d). 54-252(d),
54-253(c), 54-254(b). The threat of felony prosecution for failing to fulfill state-owed
obligations, which were not owed previously, clearly begets a change in one’s legal status
sufficient to constitute a “plus factor" within the meaning of Paul. 424 U.S. at 712.
2. The registration requirements also satisfy the “plus factor" under the Second
Circuit’s definition
The Second Circuit interprets the “plus factor’’ under Paul as being that which is
“governmental in nature," thereby removing the action from the realm of state tort law. The
court holds that, in order to state a valid section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must be able to identify
material government involvement, unique to the governmental role it serves, which can therefore
distinguish it from an ordinary defamation claim actionable under state law. Dept, of Public
Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 56 (2d Cir. 2001). To the extent that the registration and notification
requirements of the Connecticut statute cannot be enforced by a private citizen, but only by the
government, they qualify as “governmental in nature”. Id at 56. The registration requirements
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imposed by the Connecticut statute thereby also satisfy the "plus factor" under the Second
Circuit's interpretation of Paul.

Other courts have identified a protected liberty interest under the "stitzma nius"
test when damatze to reputation has been coupled with the duties imposed by
registration.
Since P^, the "stigma plus" test has been satisfied when harm to reputation has been
coupled with a right to privacy, right to public education, loss of employment opportunities, and
the imposition of registration duties. See generally Goss v. Lopez. 419 ll.S. 565,566(1975);
Dept, of Public Safety, 271 F.3d at 38; Donato v, Plainview-Old Bethoage Cen. Sch. Dist.. 96
F.3d 623, 630-633 (2d Cir. 1996); Vemiero. 119F.3d 1077, 1105. More importantly, there are a
number of recent cases in which courts have found that the imposition of registration duties in
and of themselves are sufficient to constitute a “plus factor" within the meaning of Paul- See
Poritz, 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d. at 467; Doe v. Williams: 167 F. Supp. 2d 45,
55(D.D.C. 2001).
In Poritz. the New Jersey district court found that the “stigma plus” test could be satisfied
by pairing tbe reputational damage to the registrants with their “continuing legal status as a
registrant and the duties imposed as a result.” 931 F. Supp. at 1219. Likewise, the district court
for the Southern District of New York also found that governmental action which tarnishes an
individual's reputation, when coupled with the burdens of registration, invoked a federallyprotected liberty interest warranting due process protection. Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 467. In
Pataki. the court first held that plaintiffs satisfied the stigma prong of the Paul test because the
dissemination of information required by the New York Sex Offender Registration Act was
likely to carry with it “shame humiliation, ostracism, loss of employment and decreased
opportunities for employment... physical violence, and a multitude of other adverse
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consequences." 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468. Next, the court held that the registration provisions
imposed by the statute satisfied the "plus factor" because they placed a "tangible burden" on
plaintiffs which they may have to bear for the rest of their lives. Id, The Pataki court found that
the duties imposed by registration alone sufficiently altered the legal status of the registrants and
impaired their constitutionally protected rights to liberty thereby satisfying the “stigma plus" test
as defined by Paul. Id.
Most recently, in Williams, the district court for the District of Columbia also found that
the registration burdens imposed on registrants by the District of Columbia’s Sex Offender
Registration Act satisfied the “stigma plus" test. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 55. Despite the accuracy of
the registration data and the disclaimer posted on the website, no actual assessment had ever
been made as to any registrant s present dangerousness. M, at 51. Consequently, the notification
procedures of the statute inflicted a stigma because, assuming a registrant is not presently
dangerous, the registry conveys the false message that he is. id.
The code at issue in Williams is analogous to the Connecticut statute challenged in the
instant case in that it determines the level of public notification corresponding to a registrant’s
past offense, but makes no assessment of the current risk, if any, the registrant poses. D.C. Code
Ann. § 22-4001 (2002); Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 47. As with the Connecticut statute, the
District of Columbia statute provides no opportunity for a registrant to challenge his
classification and the level of notification that accompanies it. Williams. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
1 he Williams court found that the mere implication that a registrant presently poses a danger to
society satisfied the “stigma" prong of the Paul test. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
The Williams court also found a “plus factor” because the District of Columbia statute
altered a registrant’s legal status both by imposing burdens which significantly altered the duties

36

and obligations previously owed to the Stale, and by subjecting a registrant to possible criminal
prosecution for failure to comply. Williams. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 55. (Any registrant who violates
any requirement of the statute (including any additional requirements adopted by the Court
Services and Supervision Agency) is subject to up to 180 days in prison and up to a $1000 fine.
D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4015(a) (2002).) The Connecticut statute imposes requirements similar to
those imposed by the District of Columbia's registration act and subjects a registrant to criminal
prosecution for any violation of such requirements. Compare Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250, 54251(d), 54-252(d), 54-253(c), 54-254(b) wUh D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4001 (2002).
The Williams court, therefore, concluded that the registration burdens alone constituted a
“plus factor.” Moreover, the court also found that the registration requirements, when
considered along with their effects, satisfied the “plus factor” for purposes of Paul. Williams.
167 F. Supp. 2d 55. These requirements include the duty to register with local police and the
disclosure of personal information to the public, in both printed and electronic form. Id. The
effects considered by the court included the potential harm to employment opportunities and the
certain harm to reputation that ensues when a registrant is stigmatized as a public danger. Id.
The factors considered by the Williams court are also present in the case at bar. Under
the Connecticut statute, registrants must register with local police, their personal information is
published, their employment opportunities are potentially impaired, and they are stigmatized as a
danger to society. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-257(a), 54-258(a); Lee. 132 F. Supp. 2d at 63. As in
Williams, the plaintiffs in the instant case have established the existence of a “plus factor.”
4. Registration statutes which have been held constitutional have provided for no
public disclosure, limited disclosure, or carefully tailored notification.
The Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act establishes a notification system that
applies uniformly to all sex offenders and provides their personal information indiscriminately.
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while registration laws in other states, such as New Jersey and New York, provide notification
depending on the risk level of the registrant. ^ generally. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 7-6. 7-8
(2002); N.Y. Correction Laws § 168-1 (McKinney 2002). New Jersey’s version of Megan's Law
requires that registrants be assessed individually by county prosecutors using a "Registrant Risk
Assessment Scale and subsequently placed in one of three tiers according to risk of reoffense.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 7-6. Similarly, the New York statute classifies registrants within one of
three risk levels depending on an individual assessment which weighs approximately fifteen
factors. N.Y. Correction Laws § 168-1 (McKinney 2002). Again, notification is based on
classification. In New York, a registrant even has an opportunity to challenge the Parole Board’s
recommended risk level and degree of notification. Pataki. 120 F.3d 1263, 1268-69.
Other sex offender laws in other states which have been upheld tend to limit public
disclosure. For example, under the Iowa law, internet access to registry information is available
for registrants who have been assessed to be a “moderate” or “high-risk.” Iowa Code
§ 692A.13(2) ( 2002). Registrant information, however, is nm made available to the public for
registrants who have committed a number of crimes, including nonviolent crimes. Iowa Code
§ 692A.13(6) (2002). Washington also requires that an agency provide evidence of a registrant’s
future dangerousness, likelihood of reoffense, or threat to the community before disclosure to the
public is permitted. Russell v. Grepoire 124 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Slate v.
Ward, 123 Wash. 2d 488 (1994)). Furthermore, information may only be disseminated within a
narrow geographic area. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1082^ Other states such as North Carolina do not
make registry information part of the public record at all. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.10 (2002).
The Connecticut statute, however, does not require any evidence of a registrant’s future
dangerousness, likelihood of reoffense, or threat to the community before disclosure to the public
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is permitted in full. It neither tailors the level of notification according to a risk level assessment,
nor does it attempt to limit the geographical scope of the Registr)^ dissemination. Registrants'
personal information is made available globally via the Internet, far exceeding the bounds of the
community where the offender resides. In addition, considering that sex offender notification
sites are very popular, the likelihood that a registrant’s unwarranted stigmatization will be
publicized is increased exponentially. Jane A. Small. Who are the People in Your
Neighborhood? Due Process. Public Notification, and Sex Offender Notification Laws. 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451, 1491 (1999). If the purpose of notification is to protect the community,
the protective purposes of a community notification statute cannot possibly reach the entire
world, iiat 1491-1492.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons. Respondent respectfully requests that this Court
AFFIRM the decision of the Ninth Circuit and hold that ASORA violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Likewise, Respondent also respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the decision of
the Second Circuit, and strike down the Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act as it violates
the Due Process Clause.

Dated: October 29, 2002

Respectfully Submitted,
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